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INTRODUCTION
ZANTAC®1 and XANAX®2 are not cities in China or
galaxies explored by Captain Kirk. Nor do LAMISIL®3 and
LAMICTAL®4 refer to sick farm animals. In fact, these peculiar
terms, which share both a similar handwritten appearance and
similar sound, are actually the unique brand names of four
popular prescription drugs. As with any brand name or
trademark, using these drug names in a manner likely to
confuse consumers jeopardizes the goodwill of the trademark
owner and threatens fair competition. For this reason, like any
other good or service, drug trademarks must remain subject to
regulation to ensure fair, robust competition.
There is a much more compelling reason to minimize
confusion among prescription drug names, however. That
reason is protecting lives. According to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), such confusion among look-alike and
sound-alike drugs accounts for approximately ten percent of all
reported medication errors 5 and injures approximately 1.3
million people every year. 6 One example involved an eightyear-old boy who was to be treated for Attention Deficit
Disorder with the drug methylphenidate but died after being
prescribed and ingesting methadone, the opiate-based drug
used to treat heroin withdrawal. 7 In addition, a fifty-year-old
1. ZANTAC Home Page, http://zantac.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2007)
(stating that ZANTAC helps fight Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease).
2. XANAX Home Page, http://www.anxietyinfo.com (last visited Jan. 20,
2007) (stating that XANAX helps fight anxiety disorders).
3. LAMISIL Home Page, http://www.lamisil.com (last visited Jan. 20,
2007) (stating that LAMISIL helps fight nail fungus).
4. LAMICTAL Home Page, http://www.lamictal.com (last visited Jan. 20,
2007) (stating that LAMICTAL is a maintenance medication for bipolar
disorder).
5. Carol Rados, Drug Name Confusion: Preventing Medication Errors,
FDA CONSUMER MAG., July-Aug. 2005, at 35.
6. Medication Errors, FDA CDER HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/mederror.htm.
7. Rados, supra note 5, at 35.
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woman was hospitalized after allegedly ingesting the prostate
drug FLOMAX® rather than the drug with a similar sounding
name, VOLMAX®, which is used to treat bronchospasms. 8
The health risks associated with confusingly similar drug
names have raised the eyebrows of the FDA. 9 In response, the
FDA’s Associate Director for Medication Error, Jerry Phillips,
announced that the FDA’s Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk
Assessment (now the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research)
would begin conducting independent reviews and testing of
drug trademarks. 10 Although preventing medication errors and
protecting patient safety is of utmost importance, the FDA’s
assumed authority to evaluate pharmaceutical trademarks has
placed the FDA and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) (the federal agency entrusted with regulating
trademarks) in a peculiar jurisdictional overlap.
This article argues that the current system under which the
FDA and the PTO evaluate proposed drug trademarks,
although necessary, lacks efficiency and specificity and also
fails to provide drug manufacturers with clear and predictable
guidelines for obtaining drug trademark approval. Although
maintaining public safety must remain the primary concern
regardless of how the FDA and the PTO review drug names,
this end can be achieved more appropriately and more
efficiently by requiring both agencies to develop and implement
clear, integrated, and workable guidelines for reviewing
proposed pharmaceutical trademarks.
Part I of this paper will provide a general overview of
trademark law, the Food and Drug Administration, and the
processes by which both the FDA and the PTO evaluate
proposed drug names. Part II will briefly examine alternatives
to joint agency review and will discuss why the FDA and the
PTO are indispensable to the drug name approval process,
particularly in light of the growing trend of direct-to-consumer
(DTC) advertising. Part III will highlight the complications and
inefficiencies associated with the current system of joint review
and will propose: (1) a modification of the PTO’s intent-to-use
provisions for purposes of pharmaceutical drug trademarks, and
(2) a requirement for the FDA to complete its proposed drug
8. Id.
9. Cf. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000)
(stating that a drug shall be deemed misbranded if it is false or misleading).
10. See Marc J. Scheineson, FDA Limits on Dual Trademarks Tread on
Patient Safety and Law, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 25, 2003, at 1.
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name review during a specific and predictable timeframe. Part
IV will explore specific FDA shortcomings and will argue for a
codified, statistically reliable procedure for evaluating proposed
drug names.
PART I - OVERVIEW
A. TRADEMARK LAW
1. The Functions of Trademark Law and the Likelihood of
Confusion Analysis
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof...used by a person... to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” 11 The protections
of trademark law enable the supermarket customer to choose to
purchase COCA-COLA® to the exclusion of other colas, knowing
that the famous red label showcasing white letters refers to a
particular and familiar brand of cola. Trademarks carry
economic utility in that purchasers confronted with an array of
similar products made by different producers are able to reject
potentially or actually non-satisfactory products in favor of
those that were satisfactory in the past. 12 Succinctly described,
“[t]rademarks fix responsibility. Without [trade]marks, a
seller’s mistakes or low quality products would be untraceable
to their source.” 13
Broadly speaking, trademark law is an arm of the law of
unfair competition. 14 The overarching purpose of trademark law
is to foster a competitive fair market, free from the burdens of
unfair competition, while providing consumer protection. 15 In
achieving this end, trademarks have, throughout history, served
to indicate the producer or source of the particular goods or
services offered. 16

11. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
12. J.THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed., vol. 1 2006).
13. Id. at § 2:4.
14. Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
15. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 2:2.
16. See generally Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks — Their Early History,
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To safeguard the economic value of a trademark, trademark
law aims to protect owners from the parasitic attempts of
competitors who might attempt to capture the trademark
owner’s goodwill. 17 Goodwill is “a business value that reflects
the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a
seller who has offered goods and services that the customer
likes and has found adequate to fulfill his needs.” 18 As Justice
Frankfurter explained, trademark law “promotes honesty and
comports with experience to assume that the wrongdoer who
makes profits from the sales of goods bearing a mark belonging
to another was enabled to do so because he was drawing upon
the good will generated by that mark.” 19 The forbidden practice
of “poaching” another’s goodwill, known as “infringement,” 20
has the potential to deceive consumers, rob profits, and destroy
the trademark owner’s goodwill. 21 Federal law known as the
“Lanham Trademark Act” (Lanham Act), 22 among its many
provisions, provides several remedies for trademark owners
aggrieved by the effects of infringement. 23
2. The PTO’s Role in Evaluating Trademarks
Like any other good or service, pharmaceutical trademarks

59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551–72 (1969) (giving an in-depth analysis of
trademark history).
17. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 207 (1942).
18. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 2:17.
19. Id. (stating that purchasers may be induced to buy because they
believe they are buying another’s product).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). Infringement occurs when any person
shall,
without the consent of the registrant, use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion or cause mistake or to deceive.

Id.
21. See Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 206–07.
22. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (2000).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116 (2000). The primary remedy for trademark
infringement is injunctive relief. Id. However, where a trademark owner is a
victim of willful infringement, the mark owner may be entitled to “(1) the
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs
of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). In exceptional cases, treble damages
and reasonable attorney’s fees are available.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2000).
Finally, a court may also order that the infringer destroy all infringing articles.
15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2000).
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are eligible for trademark registration with the PTO. 24
Applications for pharmaceutical trademarks are reviewed in
much the same way as applications for other trademarks. 25
The initial step in protecting a trademark is using it in
commerce. 26 The next step in protecting a trademark,
particularly a mark used nationwide in interstate commerce, is
obtaining federal registration through the PTO. 27 Although
registration of a trademark is not necessary to acquire
trademark rights, 28 registration provides greater economic
protection to the trademark owner 29 and is the key to use of the
trademark to the exclusion of others. 30
As an early alternative to using the trademark in
commerce, an applicant for federal registration may take
advantage of the Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions. 31
Applicants who file intent-to-use applications with the PTO
24. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1401.02(b) (2d ed.
1997) (listing pharmaceuticals as a class 5 good).
25. See Mary Anthony Merchant, Getting and Keeping RX Trademarks,
TECHNOLOGY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE LAW, Spring 2004, at 6, 8
(describing the PTO process for reviewing pharmaceutical trademarks). But
see, Suzanne Skolnick, Overlap in Mark Registration Authority Between the
PTO and the FDA, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 100, 100 (2001) (because of
the significant public health risks of medication errors due to confusing drug
names, the PTO has adopted a “doctrine of greater care” in resolving opposition
proceedings) (citing Martha M. Rumore, the Role of Pharmacists in the
Pharmaceutical Trademark Evaluation Process, 6 J. PHARMACY & L. 83, 85
(1997)). As compared to a non-pharmaceutical trademark application, this
elevated standard requires the applicant to overcome a more stringent
quantum of proof that the proposed trademark is not likely to cause confusion.
Skolnick, supra, at 100–01. What that quantum of proof is, however, is unclear,
because the doctrine of greater care has not been enacted into law.
26. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 19:1-5.
27. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:3.
28. One may obtain common law rights to a trademark simply by using the
trademark in commerce. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:3.
29. First, the registrant is armed with a presumption that the trademark
is valid and “incontestable” once the mark has been registered for a period of
five years. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000). Second, registration provides competitors
with constructive notice of trademark use. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000). Third, the
registrant has automatic access to the federal courts by virtue of registration
and without the need of an independent basis for federal jurisdiction such as
diversity of citizenship, subject matter jurisdiction, or supplemental
jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1070–71 (2000).
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–52, 1057 (2000) for the specific requirements
and methods of trademark registration.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b)–(d) (2000).
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need not immediately use the trademark in commerce as a
prerequisite to registration. 32 Rather, the applicant’s trademark
will be published on the principal register, and he or she may
delay use for up to six months after the PTO issues a “notice of
allowance.” 33 If the applicant is unable to use the trademark
within six months after the notice of allowance issues, the
applicant may obtain extensions in six-month increments, with
total extension time not to exceed thirty months. 34 On average,
obtaining trademark registration through the PTO’s intent-touse provisions takes approximately twenty months. 35
Whether filing a use-based application or an intent-to-use
application, obtaining federal registration under the Lanham
Act requires that the proposed trademark be sufficiently
distinct from existing trademarks such that use of the proposed
trademark will not cause confusion. 36 In determining whether
a proposed trademark is likely to cause confusion among the
purchasing public, a PTO trademark examiner considers
several factors (referred to as DuPont factors). 37 Among them
are the following:
(1)
The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.
(2)
The relatedness of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration or in
connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3)
The similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4)
The conditions under which and buyers to whom
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (2000).
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (2000) (the thirty month extension period is in
addition to the original six month period).
35. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:125 (reporting that in 2004, the
average time to obtain registration under the PTO’s intent-to-use provision
was 19.5 months).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Specifically, registration of a trademark will be
refused if the mark
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade
name previously used in the United States by another and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . .. Id. (emphasis added).
37. See In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
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sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing.
The number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods.
A valid consent agreement between the applicant
and the owner of the previously registered mark. 38

3. Confusion Analysis in the Courts
Like PTO trademark examiners evaluating a proposed
trademark, courts presiding over suits alleging trademark
infringement analyze whether the alleged infringing party is
using the plaintiff’s trademark in a manner that is likely to
confuse. 39 In evaluating the likelihood of confusion between
goods or services, courts generally consider some variant of the
eight “Polaroid factors.” 40 A judicial emphasis on consumer
confusion, which stems from adoption of the Polaroid factors,
appears in every federal appellate circuit. 41 Among its other
forms, “confusion,” in the trademark sense, may refer to product

38. TMEP, supra note 24, at § 1207.01; see also In re E.I. DuPont de
Nemours, 476 F.2d at 1361.
39. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 23:1.
40. Polaroid Co. v. Polarad Electronics Co., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). These factors include (1) the strength of the
plaintiff’s trademark; (2) the degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s trademarks; (3) the proximity of the products or services; (4) the
likelihood that the plaintiff will “bridge the gap;” (5) evidence of actual
confusion; (6) whether the defendant acted in good faith in adopting the
trademark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product or service; and (8) the
level of sophistication with which buyers purchase the product or service. Id. at
495.
41. See, e.g., Star Industries, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 383
(2d Cir. 2005) (“numerous, ordinary, prudent purchasers”) (citations omitted);
Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005);
Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir. 2005);
KOS Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 713 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“ordinary consumers”); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d
477, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2004) (the “digits of confusion” test requires analysis of
the likelihood of consumer confusion); International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe
des Bains de Mer et du Cercle Des Estrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 382
(4th Cir. 2003); Gray v. Meijer, Inc., 295 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“prospective purchasers”); Davidoff & CIE, S.A., v. PLD Intern. Corp., 263
F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233
F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2000); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d
27, 43 (1st Cir. 1998); Big O Tires, Inc. v. Bigfoot 4x4, Inc., 167 F.Supp.2d 1216,
1222 (D. Colo. 2001) (“likely to cause confusion in the market place”) (citation
omitted).
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confusion or source confusion. 42 An example of source confusion,
the most common form of trademark confusion, is the confusion
caused by the names SLICKCRAFT and SLEEKCRAFT in
reference to two different brands of boats. 43 In cases of source
confusion, the confused consumer mistakenly believes the
senior user, that is, the user entitled to priority use of the
trademark, is the manufacturer of the infringing product. 44 On
the other hand, product confusion does not involve confusion
regarding the source or origin of the goods, but may arise
merely by the “identity of the product itself.” 45 One example of
product confusion is the confusion between the cholesterol drug
ADVICOR® and the drug formerly marketed as ALTOCOR. 46
B. FDA
1. Agency Overview
The FDA is responsible for regulating select “food products,
. . . human and animal drugs, therapeutic agents of biological
origin, medical devices, [and] radiation emitting products for
consumer, medical and occupational use, cosmetics, and animal
feed.” 47 Initially named the “United States Bureau of
Chemistry,” the agency did not obtain its present name until
1930. 48 Nevertheless, while empowering the Bureau of
Chemistry, Congress paved the path for modern day drug laws
with the passage of the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906
(1906 Act). 49 The 1906 Act, ultimately inspired by journalistic
exposure of the abhorrent, “nauseating” conditions of the

42. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 23:5.
43. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1979).
44. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 23:5.
45. Id.
46. Id. Because ALTOCOR was held to be confusingly similar to
ADVICOR, ALTOCOR is no longer a trademark. See KOS Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1874 (3d Cir. 2004).
47. John P. Swann, History of the FDA, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2006). One hundred and five patients died, many of whom
were children, as a result of the drug, a chemical analogue of antifreeze, being
placed on the market without testing. Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the
Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 122 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL
MED.
456
(March
15,
1995),
available
at
http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/122/6/456.
48. Swann, supra note 47.
49. Id. See Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
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meatpacking industry, affected not only butchers, cattlemen,
and plant workers, but also individuals involved in the
manufacture and/or marketing of drugs. 50 While regulation of
the food industry was a priority under the 1906 Act, the Act also
empowered the Bureau of Chemistry to seize any food or drug
featuring labels that were either false or misleading. 51
Although the 1906 Act was a step in the right direction, the
Bureau of Chemistry did little under the Act to prevent
deceptive advertising for drugs, medical devices, and
cosmetics. 52 For example, the FDA was unable to stop
commercial sales of drugs such as Banbar, which failed to cure
diabetes as promised, and Lash-Lure mascara, which caused
blindness. 53 Despite the deceptiveness with which Banbar and
Lash-Lure were marketed, overwhelming support for the
passage of more stringent drug regulations did not arise until
1937 when over one hundred people died from Tennessee Drug
Company’s newly marketed pediatric “wonder drug” elixir
sulfanilamide. 54 As a result, President Roosevelt signed the
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) into law. 55 With
its primary aim of consumer safety, the FDCA (1) required drug
labels to incorporate directions for safe use prior to being made
available on the market, (2) prohibited the marketing of drugs
with false therapeutic claims, and (3) required FDA laboratory
analysis of all new drugs to ensure their safety for the
marketplace. 56 Today, although the FDA is charged with
protecting the public health, the agency has evolved from its
days of monitoring meatpacking plants and mascara. Currently,
the FDA employs over 9,000 individuals 57 and operates with an
annual budget of approximately 1.4 billion dollars. 58

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Swann, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FDA OFFICE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND DIVERSITY
MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN FY 2004 AND BEYOND…, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/eeo/strategicplan04.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
58. FDA Office of Financial Management, Budget Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/budgetfaqs.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2006).
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2. The FDA Drug Approval Process
“It takes twelve years on average for an experimental drug
to travel from lab to medicine chest.” 59 Before the FDA gets
involved, the drug applicant has typically completed
approximately three and one half years of pre-clinical testing. 60
The pre-clinical phase analyzes laboratory and animal studies
for the purpose of making a preliminary safety determination. 61
FDA involvement begins when the drug applicant files an
Investigational New Drug Application with the FDA. 62 Shortly
thereafter, the drug is tested on humans during three phases of
clinical trials. 63 Only 1 in 1000 drugs studied in pre-clinical
testing continues on to clinical trials. 64
During the Phase I clinical trial, which typically lasts one
year, the drug applicant administers the drug to approximately
twenty to eighty healthy volunteers to determine the drug’s
safety and dosage, and to analyze how the drug is
metabolized. 65 During Phase II, the drug applicant administers
the drug to up to 300 patient volunteers with a disease or
sickness to evaluate the drug’s efficacy and potential side effects
over the course of approximately two years. 66 During Phase III,
which typically lasts three years, the volunteer sample size
increases approximately ten-fold to verify the drug’s efficacy
and to monitor any adverse reactions from long term-use. 67
Only after completing all three stages of clinical trials does
the drug applicant file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the
FDA. 68 During this phase, the FDA reviews all phases of
clinical trials and makes a decision whether to approve or reject
the drug, a process requiring approximately two and a half
years. 69 In the end, only about one of every five drugs that enter
59. DALE E. WIERENGA & C. ROBERT EATON, PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, PHASES OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.allp.com/drug_dev.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Michelle Meadows, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs
are Safe and Effective, 36 FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE 4, (July-August 2002),
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html.
63 Id.
64 See WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Meadows, supra note 62.
69 See, e.g., id.; WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59.
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clinical trials is approved by the FDA for commercial use.70

TABLE 1: STAGES OF DRUG TESTING AND APPROVAL 71
Preclinical

Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

3.5

1

2

3

Laboratory

20 to 80 100 to 300 1000 to 3000

Testing

FDA
Review

Phase IV

Average
Years/

2.5

Stage
Test
Population

and animal
studies

healthy
File

patient

volunteers volunteers

IND

Purpose

safety and
biological
activity

FDA

volunteers

Determine
safety and
dosage

Evaluate
effectiveness,
look for side
effects

File

Additional

NDA

Verify

at
Assess

patient

effectiveness,
monitor
adverse

at

Review

marketing
FDA process / testing
Approval
required
by FDA

reactions
from

Post

long-

term use
New Drug
Candidates

5,000
compounds

5 enter trials

evaluated

1
approved

A. THE FDA AND DRUG NAMES
1. Components of a Drug Name
An FDA-approved drug has not one, but three official
names. Each drug has a chemical name, a generic (nonproprietary) name, and a brand (proprietary) name. 72 Except
for chemists, few people are likely to recognize even the names
of famous drugs such as N-(4-hydroxyphenyl) acetamide. One
does not have to be a chemist, however, to recognize the generic
name “acetaminophen.” In fact, these are the chemical and

70 WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59.
71. Id.
72. Rados, supra note 5, at 36.
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generic names of the drug known and marketed as
“TYLENOL®.” 73
a. Chemical Names
A drug’s chemical name indicates its chemical makeup and
is generally not used in practice among physicians and
pharmacists. 74 When the FDA approves a drug, the United
States Adopted Names Council (USAN Council) creates its
generic or “official” name. 75 The Council is a private
organization composed of three sponsoring organizations: the
American Medical Association, United States Pharmacopeia,
and the American Pharmaceutical Association. 76 The FDA is
also represented on the USAN Council 77 and has reserved the
authority to designate a drug name if “necessary or desirable in
the interest of usefulness and simplicity.”78 The decisions of the
USAN Council do not bind the FDA. The FDA, however, defers
to the Council in “recogniz[ing] the skill and experience of [the
USAN Council] in deriving names for drugs.” 79 After both the
USAN Council and the World Health Organization approve a
generic name, the USAN Council then publishes the name in
the “Trademark Bulletin of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America,” and in the “Pharmacopeial
Forum.” 80
b. Generic Names
A drug’s generic name is designed to direct physicians
and pharmacists to a particular drug class and is typically
composed of a medically significant stem and a chemically
significant root. 81 For example, the prefix “dopa” refers to the
class of drugs known as “dopa receptor agonists,” and the suffix

73. THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION – SECOND HOME
EDITION 88-89 (Mark H. Beers ed., Pocket Books 2003), available at
http://www.merck.com/mmhe/sec02/ch017/ch017a.html.
74. Rados, supra note 5, at 37.
75. The Merck Manual, supra note 73, at 88-89.
76. 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(c) (2006). See also Linda Gundersen, The Complex
Process of Naming Drugs, 129 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 677, 677-78 (1998),
available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/129/8/677.
77. 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(d) (2006).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 358(a) (2001).
79. See 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(c).
80. Gundersen, supra note 76.
81. Rados, supra note 5, at 37.
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“mab” refers to “monoclonal antibodies.” 82 Generic names are
continuously in the public domain. 83 Therefore, unlike a
proprietary name, the manufacturer does not have an exclusive
right to the generic name. 84 Drugs with generic prefixes and
suffixes may look and sound confusingly similar to drugs with a
similar name, but a substantially different use. 85 This can
result in patients being prescribed the wrong drugs. 86
c. Proprietary Names
Finally, a new drug will receive a proprietary name. The
FDA defines the term “proprietary name” as “the name the
applicant or other entity will use for the commercial
distribution of the product,” which is a drug’s trademark or
brand name. 87 The proprietary name is intended to solicit brand
recognition and generate sales. This name is the central focus
of a drug company’s overall advertising campaign for the
drug. 88 The drug manufacturer may acquire trademark rights
in the brand name through use and, almost invariably, federal
registration. 89 Unlike a drug’s generic name, which is intended
to describe its function or structure, 90 a proprietary name is
typically coined by consulting firms with expertise in
prescription drug “naming.” 91 As one author succinctly
summarized, “creating a generic name is a science; creating a

82. Id.
83. Gunderson, supra note 76.
84. Id.
85. One such example is confusion about the common prefix “meth,” which
has caused confusion between the substantially different drugs methadone and
methylphenidate. See Rados, supra note 5, at 35 and accompanying text.
86. See id. Although prescription errors due to confusingly similar generic
names is an important topic, the issues presented by such generic name
confusion and how they should be resolved are beyond the scope of this article.
87. See Regulatory SOPP 8001.4 Review of CBER Regulated Product
Proprietary
Names
(August
15,
2002),
http://www.fda.gov/cber/regsopp/80014.htm.
88. See Merchant, supra note 25, at 8-9.
89. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 19:1-5.
90. See The Merck Manual, supra note 73.
91. Rados, supra note 5, at 35. Brand Institute Inc. and Medical Error
Recognition are examples of these firms.
See Brand Institute Inc.,
http://www.brandinstitute.com/consumer_index.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006);
Med-E.R.R.S.®, http://www.med-errs.com/services.asp (last visited Oct. 17,
2006).
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brand name is more of an art.” 92
2. FDA Review of Proprietary Names
FDA authority for reviewing proprietary names is rooted in
the agency’s authority to regulate misleading drug labeling. 93 A
drug name may mislead if its proprietary name, “because of
similarity in spelling or pronunciation, may be confused with
the proprietary name or the [generic] name of a different drug
or ingredient.” 94 The FDA requires a drug applicant to submit
two proposed names in order of preference for review, 95 and the
FDA must review all proposed pharmaceutical and over-thecounter drug trademarks prior to their use in commerce. 96 In
rather bureaucratic fashion, the FDA’s Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (Center) assigns the majority of such
trademark reviews to the Office of Drug Safety’s (ODS)
“Division of Medication Errors and Technical Support” (Division
of Medication Errors). 97 The Division of Medication Error’s
fundamental purpose is to minimize medication errors that may
arise from drug trademarks that look or sound like the
trademarks of other drugs. 98 Typically, the FDA reviews the
proposed drug name as early as the end of Phase II clinical
trials and again within ninety days of the drug’s expected date
of approval. 99 Thus, on average, over five years lapse between
the FDA’s first review of the proposed name and the FDA’s final
review on the eve of the drug’s market approval. 100
Although both the FDA and the PTO seek to preclude
confusion, their reviews serve independent and “fundamentally
different purposes.” 101 The PTO does not guard public safety,
but rather attempts to ensure that “consumers are able to
distinguish and identify the source of the drug product bearing

92. Gundersen, supra note 76.
93. Stephen C. Clifford, The Name Game: Creating a Trademark for a New
Drug Product, DRUG DELIVERY TECH., Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.drugdeliverytech.com/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?idArticle=67. See also 21
U.S.C. § 352(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.10-201.323.
94. 21 C.F.R. § 201.10(c)(5).
95. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:149.
96. See Gundersen, supra note 76.
97. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:149.
98. Id.
99. Clifford, supra note 93.
100. See WIERENGA & EATON, supra note 59.
101. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:150.
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the trademark.” 102 The FDA’s review seeks to guard against
confusing and misleading drug names and labels that might
result in errors in prescription, dispensing, and consumption. 103
The FDA’s interest in proposed drug trade names extends, in
part, to barring drug names that are inherently misleading,
that make false promises, or suggest their function and purpose
(efficacy). 104 Such authority stems from the FDA’s mandate to
regulate false or misleading drug labels. 105 For example,
Upjohn, the manufacturer of the drug known today as
ROGAINE®, originally attempted to use the name REGAIN for
its hair growth drug. 106 The FDA denied such use, reasoning
that use of the name REGAIN would send a message to
consumers of guaranteeing, or at least suggesting, hair
growth. 107
In addition to regulating misleading drug names, the FDA
is also concerned with eliminating “look-alike sound-alike”
confusion among phonetically or visually similar drug names. 108
In evaluating whether a proposed drug name looks or sounds
like another drug, the FDA’s Division of Medication Errors first
employs an expert panel to exchange opinions regarding any
risks associated with potential look-alike or sound-alike drug
trademarks. 109 The panel is comprised of “medication error
prevention staff and representatives from the Division of Drug
Marketing and Advertising Communications.” 110 These experts
discuss whether a proposed proprietary name might be confused
with an existing name. 111 If there is a possibility of confusion,
102. Clifford, supra note 93.
103. Id.
104. Susan Ipaktchian, The Name Game, STAN. MED. MAG., Summer 2005,
available
at
http://mednews.stanford.edu/stanmed/2005summer/namegame.html.
105. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).
106. See Danielle A. Gentin, You Say Zantac, I Say Xanax: A Critique of
Drug Trademark Approval and Proposals for Reform, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
255, 260 (2000) (citations omitted).
107. See id.
108. See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:150.
109. Carol Holquist & Jerry Phillips, How FDA Reviews Drug Names, FDA
Safety
Page,
Apr.
2,
2001,
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/drug/MedErrors/reviewDrugNames.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Public Meeting Transcript, FDA Institute for Safe Medication
Practices, Evaluating Drug Names for Similarities: Methods and Approaches
(June
26,
2003),
available
at
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the panel compiles a list of proprietary names that are similar
to the proposed name. 112 This list will be one factor in the
overall consideration of whether a proposed proprietary name is
found to be likely to confuse. 113
In addition to the expert panel review, the Division of
Medication Errors also conducts handwriting and verbal
analyses to determine whether the proposed trademark is
confusingly similar to another drug name. 114 During this phase,
nurses, pharmacists, and physicians are asked to participate in
a mock simulation of the prescription ordering process. 115
Because prescription drugs may be accessed by methods other
than in writing, the Division of Medication Errors also employs
a similar evaluation for verbal prescription orders. 116
Following the handwriting and verbal analyses, the
proposed trademark is entered into an FDA computer database
designed to alert the operator of any potential look-alike soundalike confusion associated with use of the trademark. 117 Finally,
the Division of Medication Errors forwards the results to the
Center’s Office of New Drugs, which makes the final decision as
to whether the proposed name will be approved or rejected. 118
During this phase, the Office of New Drugs considers the
results from the expert panel review, the clinical analysis, and
the computer-assisted analysis to evaluate whether the
proposed drug name might be confusing in light of the following
factors: (1) the dosage forms or routes of administration
(injection, oral, etc.); (2) the marketing status (whether the
http://www.fda.gov/cder/meeting/drugnametranscript.doc.
112. Id.
113. Id. All participants must be FDA employees; non-FDA employees are
excluded from participation. Id.; see Part IV(b) infra.
114. Holquist & Phillips, supra note 109.
115. See id. One such test involves presenting the participant with a series
of handwritten drug names (some of which are on the market and some of
which are not) shown one at a time. The participant is then asked a series of
questions relating to the handwritten drug names, including what the name of
the drug was, whether the participant had seen the name before, and if so,
what condition it is used to treat. Id.
116. James A. Thomas, The Errors of Error Testing: Potential Liability
Issues for Medication Error Testing of Pharmaceutical Trademarks Under U.S.
Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325, 327 (2004). One method of testing the
likelihood that the proposed name will confuse when used verbally is the FDA’s
process of leaving telephone messages with the proposed name and questioning
the recipient of the message. See Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 111, at
55, 82.
117. See Holquist & Phillips, supra note 109.
118. Public Meeting, supra note 111, at 34.
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drug is available by prescription or over-the-counter at the time
of application); (3) the indications and directions for use; (4) the
storage configuration; (5) the clinical setting for dispensation or
use; (6) the packaging and labeling; and (6) the strength of the
drug. 119
After the above processes have been completed, the
Division of Medication Errors then forwards a detailed written
report to the Office of New Drugs, which makes the final
determination whether to approve or reject the proposed
trademark. 120
PART II – THE NECESSARY EVIL OF DUAL AGENCY
REVIEW
A. EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY
Although the FDA and the PTO are concerned with
eliminating the likelihood of confusion, each agency is
concerned with a unique type of confusion, and approval or
rejection of the proposed trademark by one agency is
independent from the other. 121 The FDA’s Division of
Medication Errors is concerned only with the clinical context in
which the proposed trademark will operate, namely whether
approval of the mark will result in confusion during the
prescription process. 122 On the other hand, the PTO is
concerned mainly with the commercial context, namely whether
approval of the mark will result in confusion about the source of
the drug. 123 Therefore, a drug manufacturer may obtain FDA
approval for a proposed drug name, yet may be unable to secure
registration with the PTO. Similarly, a drug manufacturer may
fulfill the PTO’s intent-to-use requirements but may be unable
to acquire FDA approval for the drug name.
At first blush, calling on two independent agencies to
regulate something as benign as catchy names and colorful
packaging appears wasteful and superfluous and poses obvious
questions: Is it necessary to strain the resources of both the
FDA and the PTO? If not, is it feasible to lodge this
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:149.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19.150.
See id.
See id.
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responsibility in one agency to avoid such duplicative efforts?
Although entirely removing one agency from the process
has the obvious advantage of efficiency, such a solution is
impractical for several reasons. First, no matter how adept at
determining a likelihood of source confusion, the PTO lacks the
expertise and scientific resources to conduct a full examination
of a proposed drug name, particularly the resources necessary
to determine whether a proposed trademark is intended to
describe or suggest efficacy. 124 Consider again the hair loss drug
ROGAINE®. Its original proposed name, REGAIN, falls into the
descriptive 125 category of trademarks and cannot be registered
as a trademark absent a showing of secondary meaning. 126
Confronted with a decision to approve registration of the
proposed mark, the PTO examiner lacks the expertise and the
resources necessary to determine whether the drug actually
does what it promises—that is, whether it actually helps
consumers “regain” their hair. The necessary scientific and
experimental resources and expertise to make such
determinations lie instead with the FDA. 127 Of course, the PTO
lacks the expertise to determine whether other nonpharmaceutical products do what they promise. However, the
fact that confusion among drug names may be fatal demands
that the PTO seek the guidance and input of the administration
designed to protect the public health.
Second, so long as drugs have generic names, the FDA is
the only agency suitable to participate in the USAN Council and
in the process of approving generic drug names. Therefore,
entirely removing the FDA from the drug name review process

124. Gentin, supra note 106, at 262.
125. “A descriptive term is one that directly and immediately conveys some
knowledge of the characteristics of a product or service.” MCCARTHY, supra
note 12, at § 11:16.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(1), (f) (2000) (proof of secondary meaning requires
five years of “substantially exclusive and continuous use”).
127. Despite the FDA’s expertise,
There are a number of instances where the USPTO has found
pharmaceutical trademarks to be confusingly similar. Examples of
such include Nicostatin for hyperlipidemia and Mycostatin for an
antibiotic preparation; Paxetol for cancer treatment and Paxil for an
antidepressant; Premarin for menopausal conditions and Presamine
for an antidepressant; and Nalex and Nolex, both used as nasal
decongestants.
Haseeb R. Jabbar, Pharmaceutical Trademarks: Likelihood of Confusion vs.
Likelihood of Harm, PATENT ORLANDO.COM NEWSLETTER, July 2003,
http://www.patentorlando.com/july03.html.
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is not a feasible option. With its longstanding expertise in
medicine and public health, the FDA is the only agency with
sufficient knowledge to approve names of generic drugs given a
generic name’s characteristic of conveying descriptive medical
information. 128 In contrast, the PTO does not have the
knowledge, expertise, or the resources 129 to regulate a drug’s
generic name, 130 nor does the Lanham Act provide protection
for generic names. 131 Since there is no need to register generic
names with the PTO, the agency need not concern itself with
generic name review. 132
Third, while the FDA is equipped to analyze drug efficacy,
it plays no role in federal registration of trademarks. 133 Instead,
the PTO, not the FDA, is backed by a statutory mandate and
has agency proficiency to examine whether consumers are likely
to confuse the source of a proposed trademark with the source of
a similar, existing mark. 134 Of course, federal registration is not
required to obtain a trademark. 135 Nevertheless, the nationwide
and global distribution of prescription drugs absolutely requires
trademark registration and PTO involvement. For these
reasons, both the PTO and the FDA must be involved in the
pharmaceutical trademark approval process.
B. DIRECT- TO- CONSUMER ADVERTISING AND THE GROWING
IMPORTANCE OF THE PTO
America has witnessed a staggering
increase in
pharmaceutical drug expenditures over the last decade. In 2001
alone, annual U.S. spending on prescription drugs reached
$2.38 billion— a 200-fold increase over the amount spent in
1989. 136 This increase may be attributable to the United States
128. See Gentin, supra note 106, at 262.
129. Skolnick, supra note 25, at 101.
130. For example a trademark examiner, if charged with reviewing the
generic name “rofecoxib” can not be expected to understand that the term ‘cox’
used in a generic name refers to the family of drugs known as Cox inhibitors,
let alone have any idea what a cox inhibitor is. This is a task best left to those
so trained by the FDA.
131. Skolnick, supra note 25, at 101 (citing Park N’ Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
and Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
132. Skolnick, supra note 25, at 101.
133. Gentin, supra note 106, at 258.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000).
135. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 8 (2005).
136. Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-
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Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 137 and, in large
part, to the FDA’s 1997 guidelines for using television and radio
broadcasts in DTC advertising. 138 Regardless of its roots, DTC
advertising has been highly profitable and very efficient. One
study concluded that of the 30% of respondents who spoke to
their physician about a specific drug, 44% were given a
prescription for that drug. 139 Another survey conducted by the
FDA revealed that during doctor visits, 25% of patients
requested a particular drug from their physician, and of those
individuals, 69% of them received that prescription. 140
Furthermore, in 2001, every dollar spent on DTC advertising
resulted in an additional $4.20 in sales. 141 DTC advertising is

Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
423, 424 (2002).
137. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy the Court held that a
Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs unconstitutional on First Amendment commercial speech grounds. Id. at
773. To no avail, the State of Virginia defended the law on several grounds,
including the argument that permitting such advertisements would
commercialize the job of the pharmacist and reduce his status as an expert in
prescribing drugs to that of “a mere retailer.” Id. at 768. In his dissent, Justice
Rehnquist feared that opening the door to price advertisements would
inevitably lead to non-physician commercial advertisement of the drug itself:
“In the case of ‘our’ hypothetical pharmacist, he may now presumably advertise
not only the prices of prescription drugs, but may attempt to energetically
promote their sale so long as he does so truthfully.” Id. at 788. Justice
Rehnquist’s prediction has become a reality as pharmaceutical companies now
directly advertise to the public without physician involvement.
138. See Tamar Nordenberg, Direct to You: TV Drug Ads that Make Sense,
CONSUMER
MAGAZINE,
Jan.-Feb.
1998,
available
at
FDA
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1998/198_ads.html. Prior to the 1997
guidelines, pharmaceutical companies did not utilize television or broadcast
media due to a 1983 FDA moratorium on such forms of DTC advertising. See
Patrick A. Moore & Michael A. Newton, Prescription Drug Advertising on the
Internet: A Proposal for Regulation, 2 W.VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (1998), available at
http://www.wvu.edu/~law/wvjolt/Arch/Moore/Moore.htm.
For more on the
history of the FDA’s regulation of DTC advertising, see generally id.
139. Wendy Macias & Liza Stavchansky Lewis, A Content Analysis of
Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) Prescription Drug Websites, J. OF ADVERTISING,
Winter
2003/2004,
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3694/is_200301/ai_n9321002.
Justice Rehnquist also predicted this effect, explaining that permitting
pharmacists to advertise the costs of prescription drugs would “generat[e]
patient pressure upon physicians to prescribe [advertised drugs].” Virginia
Pharmaceutical, 425 U.S. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Macias & Lewis, supra note 139.
141. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 2 (2003) available at
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expected to become even more pervasive as drug companies
further their use of the Internet, which has proven to be the
most cost-efficient and profitable method of DTC advertising. 142
The responsibility and workload of the PTO will continue to
increase as drug companies continue this onslaught of DTC
advertising. As new drugs make their way to the market, more
advertisements will undoubtedly follow. More advertisements
for more drugs, by more drug manufacturers, will have the
logical effect of increasing the amount of confusion among those
targeted by the advertisements. This increase in DTC
advertising will require use of the PTO’s expertise 143 in
minimizing source confusion. Although the FDA has the
expertise and resources to approve or reject a drug name if it is
likely to be confused in clinical settings or if it otherwise
violates the agency’s labeling requirements, it does not have the
expertise or the statutory authority to determine whether it is
likely to cause consumer confusion about the drug’s commercial
source. 144 Such a task is uniquely within the skill set of the
PTO. 145
PART III – AGENCY INTEGRATION
Since both the FDA and the PTO play indispensable and
increasingly significant roles in the drug name approval
process, improving the system under which proposed drug
names are reviewed necessarily requires cooperation between
both agencies. In its current state, however, the system of dual
agency review is unduly cumbersome and inefficient and fails to
provide drug applicants with clear and adequate guidelines for
evaluating proposed drug names. Further, the differing
timetables of the two agencies hinder the efforts of potential
drug applicants to protect their trademark interests.
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Impact-of-Direct-to-Consumer-Advertisingon-Prescription-Drug-Spending-Summary-of-Findings.pdf
142. Christopher Saunders, Web Heating Up for DTC Pharma Promotions,
Z
NEWS,
Sept.
25,
2002,
CLICK
http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/1470351. See also Moore and Newton,
supra note 138.
143. As described in Part I(a)(2), supra, the PTO’s expertise in minimizing
source confusion is rooted, in part, in its ability and exclusive authority to
scrutinize trademarks proposed for registration by application of the DuPont
factors.
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 352; 21 C.F.R. § 201.10 (2006).
145. See TMEP, supra note 4, at § 1207.01.
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Currently, obtaining trademark registration through the
PTO’s intent-to-use provisions takes an average of 19.5
months. 146 The FDA’s proprietary name review typically begins
at an unspecified point, but can occur as early as the later
stages of Phase II clinical trials. 147 In addition, an average of
more than five years will lapse between the time the drug
applicant completes clinical trials and the time the FDA
ultimately approves the drug for commercial use. 148
Commercial use, of course, is required to satisfy the Lanham
Act’s intent-to-use provision. 149 The problem is that a drug
manufacturer cannot reserve trademark rights for five years
under the intent-to-use provisions. 150 If the drug manufacturer
waits too long to file with the PTO, the manufacturer runs the
risk that a competitor will register the trademark first, thereby
surrendering commercial priority to the competitor. 151
Conversely, if the drug manufacturer prematurely files an
intent-to-use application with the PTO, it runs the risk that the
intent-to-use timeframe will expire before the FDA approves the
proposed name and before it can be used in commerce to the
satisfaction of the PTO. Consequently, since the mark is
published on the principal register after the notice of allowance
issues, 152 another user can “steal” the mark from the principal
register if the applicant is unable to use it in commerce within
the thirty month maximum timeframe of the PTO. 153
Drug manufacturers’ efforts to avoid this predicament have
spawned abuse of the Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions. 154

146. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 19:125.
147. Merchant, supra note 25, at 8.
148. See supra Part I(b)(2) (“Drug Approval Process”).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1).
150. Id. After filing an intent-to-use application with the PTO, the applicant
must use the trademark in commerce and file a statement of use within six
months after the PTO issues a notice of allowance. Id. The applicant may
obtain extensions to the six-month statement of use requirement in six-month
increments for a maximum of thirty months. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (2000).
151. Although the FDA does not publish the proposed names it receives so
that competitors could “steal” from such a publication, the possibility always
exists that a competitor will apply for and ultimately secure the same mark
before the person who initially developed the mark.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) (2000).
153. Such a “user” may be a competitor or may be another company
involved in a similar, yet distinct industry such as nutritional supplements, for
example.
154. See Melvin A. Silver, Pharmaceutical Trademarks – A Prescription for
Care, PATTISHALL, MCAULIFFE NEWSLETTER (Pattishall, McAuliffe, Chicago,
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In the current process of name review, drug manufacturers
routinely file multiple intent-to-use applications with the PTO
as a shroud to prevent competitors from determining which
names are actually submitted to the FDA pursuant to FDA
requirements. 155 Such a practice undermines the Lanham Act’s
requirement that any mark applied for be the subject of a bona
fide intent-to-use rather than registered merely to reserve
rights. 156 Not only do such frivolous filings with the PTO lockup
otherwise usable trademarks, they also undermine the Lanham
Act’s requirement that intent-to-use applications be filed in
good faith. 157 The conflicting timetables of FDA and PTO
reviews of proposed drug names encourage applicants to evade
the PTO’s good faith requirement and, in the end, waste
valuable PTO resources and undermine the agency’s efficiency.
First, to reduce such abuse and minimize gamesmanship,
the PTO should place limits on the number of intent-to-use
applications a drug manufacturer may submit for any one drug.
Unlike the FDA, which limits its name review to two proposed
names, the PTO places no restrictions on the number of intentto-use applications that may be filed for a drug. 158 Not only will
limiting the number of intent-to-use applications prevent
applicants from locking up marks they never intend to use, it
will also better serve the good faith requirement of the Lanham
Act’s intent-to-use provision.
Second, to reduce the temporal hurdles associated with
complying with the PTO’s intent-to-use provisions, the PTO
should not accept intent-to-use applications until the FDA
approves the proposed name at a specific point during Phase
III, rather than Phase II, clinical trials.159 Requiring the FDA
Ill.),
Winter
2002,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.pattishall.com/pdfs/winter_2002.pdf.
155. Id.
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2000) (explaining that the intent-to-use
application must include a statement that the mark is “used in commerce”).
“The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (2000) (emphasis added).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (2000).
158. Merchant, supra note 25, at 8. Arguably, the PTO’s bona fide intent-touse requirement is, by itself, a restriction on the number of intent-to-use
applications that may be filed. Nonetheless, the PTO should develop and
enforce a specific limit to the number of intent-to-use applications that may be
filed.
159. This change can be implemented most effectively by a specific
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to complete its review of the drug brand name no earlier than
1.5 years into Phase III clinical trials will help ensure that the
PTO’s intent-to-use provisions are not ultimately exhausted.
Similarly, delaying FDA review will ensure that drug
manufacturers are able to use the approved name in commerce
within the timeframe of the current intent-to-use provisions. 160
These proposed solutions, however, are not without
downsides. Placing a restriction on the number of intent-to-use
applications that a drug trademark applicant may file singles
out the pharmaceutical industry while permitting other
industries to continue the practice of filing multiple
applications. Nonetheless, the complexity surrounding
pharmaceutical trademarks calls for a unique set of regulations
to manage that complexity; put simply, desperate times call for
desperate measures. Even if the pharmaceutical industry is
unfairly targeted by such a restriction, the result will only
ensure compliance with the congressional requirement that
applicants manifest a bona fide intent-to-use the mark in
commerce; a requirement that other industries should already
be following.
Another concern is whether the Lanham Act forbids the
FDA from acting as a gatekeeper for the PTO in filtering out the
pool of proposed trademarks to be reviewed by the PTO. What
business does the FDA have telling the PTO which drug names
are and are not deserving of federal registration? After all, the
PTO has the sole authority to register trademarks and
Although
administer proceedings associated therewith. 161
valid, such a concern exalts form over function. Because a
pharmaceutical drug trademark cannot realistically be used in
amendment to the Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions directed toward
pharmaceutical trademarks. The following language could be used in such an
amendment: “In the case of class 5 goods, the applicant shall not submit its
application under this section without a verified statement of approval from
the Food and Drug Administration.”
160. Another conceivable solution is to simply extend the PTO’s intent-touse provisions for class 5 trademarks (pharmaceuticals). Although such an
exception would permit applicant’s to reserve rights in the proposed mark, it
would contribute to the overall inefficiency of the drug name approval process.
Such a process would continue to encourage drug applicants to file multiple
intent-to-use applications, thereby drawing on the PTO’s already limited
resources. The better solution is to require definitive timelines and attempt to
operate within the already generous intent-to-use timeframe.
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000) (“The Director shall make rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the
Patent and Trademark Office under this chapter.”).
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commerce unless approved by both the FDA and the PTO, it
makes no difference whether the FDA rejects a drug name
before the PTO can review it. On the other hand, predicating
PTO review on FDA approval will increase efficiency because
the PTO will not be required to review multiple intent-to-use
applications for names that will later be rejected by the FDA.
PART IV – SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT FDA
CONFUSION ANALYSIS & PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A more predictable and efficient system of pharmaceutical
brand name review may be accomplished by integrating the
procedures by which the PTO and the FDA analyze likelihood of
confusion and by substantively improving the manner in which
the FDA conducts its confusion analysis. The current process by
which the FDA evaluates look-alike, sound-alike confusion
among proposed proprietary names is flawed. Studies designed
to simulate the prescription of a proposed proprietary name lack
the statistical precision and accuracy necessary to provide
pharmaceutical companies with a predictable and evenhanded
appraisal of their proposed names. Furthermore, the FDA
provides no definite and objective criteria by which proposed
proprietary names will be evaluated, imposing significant
financial burdens on pharmaceutical companies.
A. THE LACK OF SPECIFIC FDA GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA FOR
REVIEWING PROPOSED DRUG NAMES IMPOSES AN UNDUE
BURDEN ON DRUG MANUFACTURERS.
As explained by one pharmaceutical trademark consulting
firm, “[t]he proprietary name is an unsleeping salesman that
ceaselessly promotes the product and, therefore, should pack as
much recognition and recall value as possible.” 162 As this quote
suggests, naming a pharmaceutical drug can be an expensive
process. In fact, many pharmaceutical companies spend more
money on drug marketing than on research and development. 163
162. James L. Dettore & Patricia K. Staub, Legal and Regulatory
Considerations in the Selection of a Pharmaceutical Proprietary Name, Sept.
28, 2001, http://www2.brandinst.com/NEWS/FOCUS_12_01.HTM.
163. See Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System:
How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the
Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 45 (2002) (reporting that “brand
name [drug] companies” allocate twelve percent of their budgets to research
and development and thirty percent toward marketing). In 2000, the most
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For every drug, it is estimated that pharmaceutical companies
spend anywhere from $250,000 to $2.5 million on developing a
name that will have a favorable impact on the public. 164 The
naming process is a calculated and deliberate attempt to
conjure up a favorable image in the minds of consumers. This
process usually involves the help of pharmaceutical marketing
firms. 165
Drug naming is not only expensive; it is also highly
technical and subliminal. “Relational asemantics” 166 or
“phonologics” for example, are terms drug-branding experts
have used to describe the unconscious reaction one may have to
hearing a drug name. 167 “Fricative” letters such as X, F, S, and
Z are frequently used to imply speed. 168 Examples include
XANAX®, ZYRTEC®, and ZOVIRAX®. “Plosive” letters such as
P, T, and D, are also used frequently in a drug name to convey a
subliminal indication of power. 169 Examples include
TORADOL®, DOLOBID®, and TESTODERM®. In addition to
developing names that convey speed or power, pharmaceutical
companies may also invest in developing suggestive
trademarks. Examples include the drug CELEBREX®, which is
intended to convey celebration, 170 and CLARITIN®, intended to
convey clarity. 171 Some names are even more imaginative. The
well known drug VIAGRA®, with its use of the prefix “vi,” is
said to indicate vitality and “conjur[e] images of power and fury
of Niagara Falls.” 172
With the FDA’s current role in the drug name approval
process, pharmaceutical companies are left without any
profitable pharmaceutical companies spent three times more on drug
marketing than on research and development. Id.
164. See Julie Kirkwood, What’s in a Name? EAGLE TRIBUNE (North
Andover,
Mass.),
Sept.
1,
2003,
available
at
http://www.igorinternational.com/press/eagletrib-drug-names.php. See also
Ipaktchian, supra note 104.
165. Some
of
these
firms
include
Brand
Institute
Inc.
(http://www2.brandinst.com) and Med-E.R.R.S., Inc. (http://www.mederrs.com).
166. See Rados, supra note 5.
167. Donald G. McNeil Jr., The Science of Naming Drugs (Sorry, the Z is
Already Taken), NY TIMES, Dec. 27, 2003, § 4, at 10.
168. Ipaktchian, supra note 104.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Kirkwood, supra note 164.
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regulations or indication as to what criteria and standards the
FDA uses in reviewing a proposed name. Unlike the PTO, which
follows the Trademark Manual of Examination Procedures
(TMEP), which provides some objective explanation as to how a
proposed mark will be reviewed, the FDA has no regulations or
clear protocols for drug manufacturers to follow. Applicants are
left only with those provisions detailing the FDA’s
administrative authority to regulate misleading drug labels 173
and a general knowledge that the drug name will undergo
surveys that will be limited to FDA employees. How and when
these surveys will be conducted, the method used to select the
survey participants, and the time and manner in which these
events will occur are unknown and are evidently left to the
discretion of the FDA.
These procedures need to be codified or adopted in the Code
of Federal Regulations just as the TMEP describes how a
trademark will be reviewed. Doing so will provide drug
applicants with an objective and predictable framework under
which they can develop their brand names. 174 So long as the
current system persists in its ambiguity and discretion,
pharmaceutical companies will continue to face the risk of
wasting millions of dollars on blind development of proposed
drug names that the FDA may ultimately reject using
subjective criteria not rooted in any specific rule of law.
B. CURRENT FDA REVIEW OF LOOK-ALIKE SOUND-ALIKE
CONFUSION LACKS PRECISION AND ACCURACY
In a public meeting discussing look-alike sound-alike
confusion of drug names, Tom Hassall, director and regulatory
liaison of Merck pharmaceuticals, concluded, “prescription
analysis studies don’t really test the name for the risk of
medication error.” 175 Partially to blame is the FDA’s failure to
employ sound statistical principles that account for the lack of
reliability in the prescription analysis studies. Although the
FDA cannot be expected to create a statistically flawless
method of evaluating a concept as subjective as look-alike
sound-alike confusion, the agency should review proposed drug
names with elementary statistical principals in mind.
173. 21 U.S.C.§ 352(a) (2000). See also, 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.10- 201.323 (2006).
174. See Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 111, at 52.
175. Id. at 58.
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A reliable survey must incorporate an adequate pool of
participants free from selection bias. 176 Selection bias, in
particular, is “a systematic tendency on the part of the sampling
procedure to exclude one kind of person or another from the
sample.” 177 Bias in the selection procedure can destroy the
accuracy of the study even when the overall sample size is
sufficient. 178
In the United States, there are over 500,000 physicians 179
and approximately 230,000 pharmacists. 180 Rather than utilize
this qualified and diverse base of physicians and pharmacists,
the FDA samples approximately 130 persons, all of whom are
FDA employees, for its handwriting and verbal analysis testing.
181 Thus, the vast majority of physicians and pharmacists who
are not FDA employees are excluded from the sample. Biasing
the sample in this manner fails to test confusion possibilities in
the broad array of clinical settings in which physicians and
pharmacists work. The clinical circumstances surrounding a
prescription ordered in a busy emergency room, for example,
may be very different than the circumstances surrounding a
prescription that is written by a family physician.
The FDA’s sample may be further biased if the same
participants are routinely being used to participate in the
clinical evaluations. If a particular doctor is asked to participate
in a proprietary name evaluation and has already done so with
four different prescription drugs, he may have a tendency to
compare the relative degree of look-alike sound-alike confusion
that one proposed name has to existing drugs to the degree of
look-alike sound-alike confusion another drug had with other
drug names.
For these reasons, in its surveys, the FDA should utilize a
randomized sample of physician-prescribers and pharmacists
employed in a wide variety of settings and should not limit its
survey participants to FDA employees.

176. See DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI & ROGER PURVES, STATISTICS
335 (3d ed. 1998).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2006-07 ed.), available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos074.pdf (reporting that physicians and surgeons
accounted for 567,000 jobs in 2004).
180. Id.
181. Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 111, at 55.
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One major hurdle to implementing more reliable surveys is
the FDA’s confidentiality requirements. 182 Currently, the
character and proposed name of a drug pending FDA approval
is confidential. 183 To the extent these confidentiality
requirements ultimately protect patent rights and the medical
records of those participating in clinical trials, such
confidentiality is necessary. However, there is little use in
keeping proposed drug names confidential. To eliminate
selection bias and ultimately increase accuracy, the FDA should
relax its confidentiality requirements, so that it may utilize
participants from outside of the FDA to participate in its
confusion testing.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the complexities surrounding the approval of
proposed pharmaceutical drug names require the expertise and
resources of both the FDA and the PTO. Although both agencies
play a role in the current process of reviewing, approving, and
regulating pharmaceutical trademarks, the current method is
legally unsound, inefficient, and fails to provide pharmaceutical
manufacturers with deliberate and reliable guidelines for
developing drug names. Until the FDA can provide an
impartial, statistically accurate method of reviewing the degree
of confusion that a proposed drug name elicits, and until the
PTO and the FDA can coordinate their timetables to permit
pharmaceutical companies to comply in good faith with the
Lanham Act’s intent-to-use provisions, millions of dollars spent
on developing drug names will continue to be in jeopardy.

182. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 601.50; 21 C.F.R. § 601.51.
(2006).
183. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(b) (2006) (“FDA will not publicly disclose the
existence of an application [which includes the proposed drug names] . . . before
an approvable letter is sent to the applicant.”).

